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PROPERTY
Symeon Symeonides*
POSSESSORY ACTIONS AGAINST THE STATE
The Todd Sequel
Todd v. Department of Natural Resources' involved a question that
perhaps should have never been asked: whether a possessory action may

be brought against the state by a private person. This question admits
of three different answers, "yes,"

"no," and "yes, but," and all three

were given at one point or another by the five court decisions in the
Todd series.2 This fact alone suggests that Todd involved difficult issues

on which reasonable persons may not only disagree, but they may also
change their minds. The "yes"

answer was adopted by the lower courts

which had rendered a judgment against the state under the same circumstances as they would against a private defendant.' The "no" answer
was adopted by three members of the supreme court on original hearing

and on second rehearing, and by four members of the Court on rehearing." These Justices will be referred to hereinafter collectively as
Copyright 1986;,by
*
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Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. 474 So. 2d 430 (La. 1985).
2. The five decisions are the decision of the trial court (unpublished); the decision
of the court of appeal, 422 So. 2d 1353 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982); the decision of the
supreme court on original hearing, 456 So. 2d 1340 (La. 1983); the decision of the same
court on rehearing, 456 So. 2d at 1356; and the decision of the supreme court on second
rehearing, 465 So. 2d 712 (La. 1985). This decision is reprinted in 474 So. 2d 430, this
time including the dissenting opinions by Chief Justice Dixon and Justices Marcus and
Blanche. All references hereinafter to the court's opinion on second rehearing will be to
this latter printing of the decision.
3. The trial court granted and the court of appeal affirmed a judgment for the
plaintiff upon proof that he had satisfied the requirements of La. Code Civ. P. art.
3658, i.e., possession of the property for a year preceding the state's disturbance. The
state's "peremptory exception of sovereign immunity," asserting that no possessory action
may be brought against the state was specifically rejected, and the state was ordered to
file a petitory action within sixty days under La. Code Civ. P. art. 3662(2). For a full
discussion of the court of appeal opinion, see Symeonides, Developments in the Law,
1982-1983-Property, 44 La. L. Rev. 505, 505-13 (1983). The court of appeals did not
discuss the distinction between public and private things, which played a major role in
the decision of the supreme court, and which is the focus of this article.
4. On original hearing, the three dissenters were Chief Justice Dixon, Justice Marcus,
and Justice Lemmon. On rehearing, they were joined by Justice Blanche who also wrote
the opinion for a majority of four. On second rehearing, they lost the support of Justice
Lemmon who joined the other three justices, thus forming a new majority of four.
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"dissenters," although at one point they formed the majority. The "yes,
but" answer was adopted by a four-member majority of the supreme
court on original hearing' and on second rehearing, 6 and is the court's
final decision. The court held that a possessory action may be brought
against the state, but only with regard to immovables which, like the
one involved in Todd, are not classified by the Civil Code as public
things.

7

The affirmative part of this holding is eminently correct for reasons
explained by this author in a previous symposium article discussing and
applauding the decision of the court of appeals.' That discussion will
not be repeated here, especially since the views expressed therein have

-by now found a much more eloquent and authoritative expression in
the majority opinions of Justice Calogero. This article focuses on the
problems that might be created by the negative part of the court's
holding pertaining to public things. Before doing so, however, a brief

comment on the dissenters' thesis is in order.
The Todd Dissenters
Briefly stated, the dissenters' thesis is that, regardless of whether
the disputed property is a public or a private thing, "one does not have
a cause of action to maintain a possessory action against the state

because one can never acquire ownership of state lands simply through

5. See 456 So. 2d 1340 (La. 1983). Majority opinion by Justice Calogero, joined
by Justices Blanche, Dennis, and Watson.
6. See 474 So. 2d 430 (La. 1985). Majority opinion by Justice Calogero, joined by
Justices Dennis, Watson, and Lemmon.
7. While public things may not be objects of possession by private individuals,
our jurisprudence, consistent with Louisiana's Civil Code and French theories,
allows private things ... to be the objects of a possessory action. And our
courts have awarded judgment favorable to the private litigant when the private
nature of the property has been established .... Thus, the success or failure
of a possessory action against the state will depend in part on the judicial
determination concerning the nature of the object of that possessory action,
that is whether the property is public or private in nature.
456 So. 2d 1340 at 1349 (Calogero, J., original hearing). The supreme court reversed the
part of the judgment of the court of appeals which had ordered the state to bring a
petitory action within sixty days under La. Code of Civ. P. art. 3662(2). The supreme
court held that this article could not constitutionally apply against the state because it
would result in an indirect loss of state property by prescription in the event that the
state were unable to file the petitory action within the sixty day period. This would be
in violation of the constitutional prohibition of the running of prescription against the
state contained in La. Const. art. IX, § 4(B); art. XII, § 13 (1974).
8. See Symeonides, supra note 3, at 505-13.
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possession. ' 9 A full rebuttal of this thesis is more competently undertaken in the majority's lengthy responses, 0 and is beyond the scope of
this article." In fairness to the dissenters, one must recognize at the
outset that their opinions are motivated by an honest and laudable desire
to protect the interests of the state. In the words of Chief Justice Dixon,
[t]he state, . . . in the past, has been powerless to protect itself
against loss of its assets to people who see no moral wrong in
taking property which is not in use and which belongs to no
one except the state, an entity with no face, no soul and little
personality. 12
One can, therefore, understand the concerns of the dissenters in seeing
to it that this "said [sic] experience"'" is not repeated. It is equally
true, however, that these concerns have been alleviated by the constitutional prohibition of the loss of state property by prescription."' The
necessity, validity, and soundness of this prohibition has never been
doubted, not even by Mr. Todd. However, to say that because prescription against the state is prohibited, so is possession, is to reason
backwards. It is an elementary maxim of interpretation that, while the
permission of the major includes the minor, the prohibition of the major
does not include the minor. More importantly, it is not a coincidence
that the prohibition of prescription against the state is grounded on a
known and proven state of affairs: that the possessed property belongs
to the state. On the other hand, in the context of a possessory action,
the ownership of the land is neither proven nor known, nor even
knowable. 5 Yet the dissenters assume throughout that which is not
known, based merely on the state's unsubstantiated claim of ownership.
They treat the state as the lawful owner of the land, and the possessor
as nothing but a usurper trying to rip-off the state from its mineralwealth. Under such an assumption it would be "a useless [and perhaps
dangerous] exercise first to give judicial recognition to a plaintiff's right
to possess against the state and then later tell him that his possession
will never be sufficient to acquire ownership,"'' 6 given the constitutional

9. 456 So. 2d at 1359 (Blanche, J., on rehearing). See also Chief Justice Dixon
dissenting on original hearing: "[tihis requirement should be enforced, whether the land
is said to be owned by the state in its 'private' capacity or 'public' capacity." Id. at
1356.
10. See 474 So. 2d at 431 (Calogero, J., writing for the majority on second rehearing).
See also Justice Dennis' dissenting opinion on rehearing, 456 So. 2d at 1360-61.
11. See supra note 8.
12. 456 So. 2d at 1356 (Dixon C.J., dissenting on original hearing).
13. Id.
14. See La. Const. art. IX, § 4(B); art. XII, § 13 (1974).
15. See La. Civ. Code P. art. 3661, reproduced infra note 38.
16. 456 So. 2d at 1359 (Blanche, J., for the majority on rehearing). See also 475
So. 2d at 438 (Blanche, J., dissenting on second rehearing).
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prohibition against the loss of state property by prescription. However,

that such an assumption is impermissible in the context of a possessory
action is not a matter of opinion or preference, but rather a matter
of positive law which expressly prohibits any assumption, assertion, or
adjudication of ownership in the context of the possessory action., 7 The
same subconscious bias is reflected in another statement of the dissenters,
that "the true objective of the possessory action . . . [is] to protect one
good faith possession of property as prescription accrues.'" In the first
place, the good or bad faith of the possessor is simply immaterial in
the context of a possessory action. 9 Secondly, the protection of the
possessory action is not granted to a possessor in order to enable him
to become owner by prescription, but because he may well be the owner.
The system presumes that he is the owner "because this factual state

of affairs [i.e., his possession] is generally conformable to the legal state
of affairs [i.e., ownership]" 20 and grants him what is essentially a
temporary protection, until someone else comes forward with affirmative
proof of his own ownership. Thirdly, in this particular case, this temporary protection does not in any way endanger the state's ownership,
if such exists, given the constitutional prohibition against the loss of

state property by prescription. This prohibition was strengthened rather
than weakened by the majority's decision.2 ' Thus, the otherwise commendable concerns of the dissenters "to protect the wealth of . . . [the
state's] lands and minerals, all of which reside in the people of this
State," 22 were not really implicated in the Todd dispute. State lands
can never be lost by prescription, 23 and no one has suggested that they
should.2 4 State minerals or timber also can never be lost to a possessor

17. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 3661, reproduced infra note 38.
18. 456 So. 2d at 1359 (Blanche, J., on rehearing).
19. See La. Civ. Code P. art. 1360, which provides that the possessory action is
available for the protection of a possessor "whether in good or bad faith, or even as a
usurper." (emphasis added).
20. 1 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law pt. 2, No. 2286, at 352 (12th ed. La.
St. L. Inst. trans. 1959).
21. See supra note 7.
22. 456 So. 2d at 1359 (Blanche, J., on rehearing). See also Chief Justice Dixon's
dissenting opinion on original hearing, id. at 1356.
23. See supra note 14.
24. It seems that the dissenters feared that permitting a possessory action against the
state would amount to permitting prescription to run against the state. Justice Blanche
wrote: "[Tihis policy would not be served by creating a distinction between public things
and private things and permitting prescription against the state depending upon the nature
of the State's ownership." 456 So. 2d at 1359 (Blanche, J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Dixon in his dissenting opinion on original hearing wrote: "[tihese benefits of ownership
are substantial rights which the state would lose by prescription to a possessor." Id. at
1355 (Dixon, J., dissenting). However, for the same reasons that the constitutional prohibition of the running of prescription against the state does not entail a prohibition of
possession against the state, permitting a possessory action against the state would not
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even if he is in good faith, since they are products rather than fruits. 25
The strongest point in the dissenters' thesis is the argument that the
one year of possession that is necessary for acquiring the "right to
possess, "26 and thus possessory protection, "is itself a kind of prescription . . . which cannot run against the state."" Indeed the common
denominator between the two rights is that they both come into existence
with the passage of time, but on balance the majority is correct in
saying that the right to possess "is no prescriptive right, but a procedural
assurance of the fact of undisturbed possession. ' 28 More importantly,
however, even if the right to possess is viewed as a prescriptive right,
its operation would offend the constitutional prohibition of prescription
against the state only if we assume that the possessed property belongs
to the state. As said earlier, such an assumption cannot be made in
the context of a possessory action. The state should not be allowed to
suppress this right by merely claiming without proving that it owns the
possessed property, or without proving its own right to possess.
The Todd Majority2 9
The balance of this section of. the article discusses the part of the
majority opinion pertaining to public things,30 and more particularly its
pronouncement that "public things may not be the objects of [adverse]
possession by private individuals."'"
The meaning of the pronouncement that "public things may not
be the objects of possession by private individuals"
As explained elsewhere,32 this pronouncement has a better foundation
on policy than on positive law. The only legislative provision that may

in any way amount to permitting prescription to run against the state. This could only
be accomplished by a constitutional amendment which, for the very reasons eloquently
described by the Chief Justice, shall never be advocated.
25. See La. Civ. Code art. 488. See also Justice Dennis' dissenting opinion on
rehearing, 456 So. 2d at 1360-61; Justice Calogero's opinion on second rehearing, 474
So. 2d at 433-34.
26. For the meaning of the term "right to possess," see Symeonides, One Hundred
Footnotes to the New Law of Possession and Acquisitive Prescription, 44 La. L. Rev.
69, 94 (1983).
27. 456 So. 2d at 1355 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting on original hearing).
28. 474 So. 2d at 438 (Calogero, J., for the majority on second rehearing).
29. Unless otherwise indicated, all references hereinafter to the Todd majority are to
the majority opinion by Justice Calogero on original hearing, 456 So. 2d 1340.
30. According to La. Civ. Code art. 450, public are the things which "are owned
by the state or its political subdivisions in their capacity as public persons .. . such as
running waters, the waters and bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, the territorial
sea, . . . the seashore . .. streets and public squares."
31. 456 So. 2d at 1349.
32. Symeonides, supra note 3 at 511-12 n.36.
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support the proposition that adverse possession of public things may,
in some respects, be legally ineffective is Civil Code article 458, which
may be read as negating the possessor's right of retention and reimbursement,33 only with regard to "[wjorks built without lawful permit
on public things, . . . that obstruct the public use."13 4 Whether this
narrow provision may be generalized into a broader principle denying
all other claims that the possessor may have under the law of accession,
or with regard to works that do not obstruct the public use, is a debatable
proposition which is beyond the scope of this article.3 5 Assuming, however, that such a principle may be extrapolated from a broad conception
of public policy, that principle would obviously be applicable only after
the public character of the disputed property has been established, and
not before. If and when such determination is made, then, according
to Todd, "the public is entitled to enter thereon at once."'3 6 It is in
these italicized words that one should look for the meaning of the above
captioned Todd pronouncement, and for the difference between possession of private and possession of public things. The italicized words
simply suggest that, with regard to things proven to be public, "the
possessor . . . may [not] retain possession of the thing until he is
reimbursed for expenses and improvements which he is entitled to claim." 37
He must deliver possession "at once."
However, since the determination that the disputed property is in
fact a public thing presupposes adjudication of ownership, here public
ownership, and since ownership cannot be adjudicated in a possessory
action,38 the distinction between public and private things is simply
irrelevant to the question of the availability of the possessory action
against the state. In fact, in that context, any reference to the disputed
property as public is what grammarians call proteron hysteron. As the
Todd court correctly recognized, "referring to land as 'public' at the

33.

See La. Civ. Code art. 529.

34.

La. Civ. Code art. 458 (emphasis added).

35.
36.

See supra note 32.
456 So. 2d at 1348, quoting from Bruning

v. City of New Orleans, 165 La. 511,
526, 115 So. 733, 737 (1928) (on first rehearing), quoting from Martin v. City of Lafayette,
162 La. 262, 264, 110 So. 415, 416 (1926) (emphasis added).

37.
38.

La. Civ. Code art. 529.
La. Code Civ. P. art. 3661 provides as follows:
In the possessory action, the ownership or title of the parties to the immovable
property or real right therein is not at issue.
No evidence of ownership or title to the immovable property or real right
therein shall be admitted except to prove:
(1) The possession thereof by a party as owner;
(2) The extent of the possession thereof by a party; or
(3) The length of time in which a party and his ancestors in title have had
possession thereof.
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outset of a possessory action . . . presupposes a state of affairs which
may well not be the case. It presupposes that the property in question
is owned by the state. . . Such a determination will more properly be
made in a petitory, or perhaps some other action." 3 9 Hence, while it
is correct to say that "the success or failure of a possessory action
against the state will depend in part on the judicial determination con' 40 it
cerning ... whether the property is public or private in nature,
is not correct to say that "[t]he availability of a possessory action . . .
depends . . . upon whether the property is" ' 4 1 private or public. The
possessory action is available with regard to all things, public or private,
and against all defendants, public or private, 42 for the simple reason
that its objective is not to determine ownership, but rather the factual
state of affairs we call possession.
The distinction between public and private things and the burden
of proof in real actions involving the state43
In view of the above, the distinction between public and private
things should have no bearing on the plaintiff's burden of proof in a
possessory action, or in any other real action involving the state in
which the private litigant is in possession." The burden of proving that
the disputed property is a public thing should rest with the party who
benefits from that proof, i.e., the state. This thesis may well be selfevident-at least it was evident before Todd. However, some language
in Todd may be used in support of a contrary thesis. For instance, it
could be argued that in a possessory action against the state, the plaintiff
should be required to prove as a condition precedent to the admissibility
of his action that the disputed property is susceptible to possession,
which would be just a different way of saying that he must prove
affirmatively that the disputed property is not a public thing.4 5 This

39. 456 So. 2d at 1350-51.
40. Id. at 1349 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 1350 (emphasis added).
42. See Symeonides, supra note 3, at 508.
43. The following discussion is also applicable to the political subdivisions of the
state.
44. These other real actions include: a petitory action filed by the state; an "action
for declaratory judgment, concursus, expropriation or similar proceedings," see La. Code
Civ. P. art. 3654, initiated by either side; or a boundary action. A petitory action filed
by the private litigant would not involve the issues discussed hereinafter because such an
action presupposes that the plaintiff "is not in possession." La. Code Civ. P. art. 3651.
45. See, e.g., Chief Justice Dixon's position expressed in his dissenting opinion on
original hearing.
The better policy ... would be to require a plaintiff who claims the right to
possess against the state, to prove that the state did not own the land. This
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argument could be extended to all other real actions involving the state,
in which the private litigant seeks to utilize the procedural advantage
of his possession in order to place on his adversary, the state, the heavier
burden of proving ownership rather than merely "better title." '46 It is
submitted that, for reasons explained below, both of these arguments
must be rejected. The following rather cryptic language from Todd
addresses these questions only in the context of a possessory action.
But, analytically, the same questions may arise in other real actions as

well .47
The state, of course, will defeat the possessory action if they
can show that the disputed property is "public," be it by nature
or by use. La. C.C. arts. 450 and 455. The private litigant
plaintiff otherwise entitled will succeed

. . .

if the disputed prop-

erty is shown to be "private" in nature, irrespective of whether
the owner is ultimately found to be a private person or the
4
state in its private capacity. 1
The first sentence is clear. Indeed, proof by the state that the
disputed property is a public thing, such as one of the things enumerated
in Civil Code article 450, 49 defeats the possessory action, and, in fact,
any other real action as well. After all, although possession creates a
presumption of, and is often a prelude to, ownership, possession is
subordinate thereto. It must be noted at this point that an assertion by
the state that the disputed property is a public thing may be tantamount
to an assertion of ownership. If Code of Civil Procedure article 3657(2)
is applied squarely, such an assertion "converts the suit into a petitory
action, and judicially confesses the possession of the plaintiff." The
state then assumes the position of a plaintiff in a petitory action against
a defendant in possession: 0 Again, if Code of Civil Procedure article
3653 and Civil Code article 531 are applied as written, the state's burden
would be to prove ownership rather than merely better title.' However,
it must also be noted that this conversion of the action into petitory

requirement should be enforced, whether the land is said to be owned by the
state in its "private" capacity or "public" capacity.
456 So. 2d 1353.
46. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3653(2), 3654(2); La. Civ. Code art. 531.
47. See supra note 44.
48. 456 So. 2d at 1350-51 (emphasis added).
49. See supra note 30.
50. See A. Yiannopoulos, Property § 219, at 585-86, in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(2d ed. 1980).
51. "One who claims the ownership of an immovable against another in possession
must prove that he has acquired ownership from a previous owner or by acquisitive
prescription. If neither party is in possession, he need only prove a better title." La. Civ.
Code art. 531. See also the identical language of La. Code Civ. P. art. 3653.
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is by no means forced upon the state. The state is free to defend the
possessory action by merely denying the plaintiff's possession, without
asserting its own possession or ownership; or the state may deny the
plaintiff's possession and assert its own possession, based, for instance,
on proof that the disputed property is covered by navigable waters, but
without formally pleading for recognition of its ownership.5 2
The
phrase "by use" in combination with the court's citation of Civil Code
article 455 in the first sentence quoted above warrants a small pause.
Article 455 deals with private things subject to public use, such as the
banks of navigable rivers. Although, in a sense, public "by use," these
things are by no means public in terms of ownership, or "public things"
as the term is employed in the Civil Code.5" By definition, they are
susceptible not only to private ownership but to possession as well, to
the extent that such possession does not obstruct the public use.54 Thus,
proof by the state that the disputed property is the bank of a navigable
river does not necessarily, or wholly, defeat the possessory action. The
plaintiff's right to possess the bank should be recognized, subject of
course to his legally imposed obligation to abstain from obstructing the
public use. It should be the state's burden to prove that the private
possession obstructs public use.
The second sentence in the Todd language quoted above is less clear,
and may in fact detract some of the clarity of the first sentence. If the
use of the third singular person "is shown," rather than the first person,
"the plaintiff shows," is deliberate, then the second sentence merely
complements the first. The two sentences together would mean that
"unless the state proves that the disputed property is public," then "the
disputed property is [shown to be] private." If so, this writer has no
quarrel with this language. However, the language might be interpreted
as requiring that the plaintiff proves affirmatively that the disputed
property is private in nature and thus susceptible to possession, before

52.

See, e.g., Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Neal, 428 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 3d

Cir. 1983) ("The assertion of title, in order to be sufficient to convert the suit into a
petitory action, should consist of some formal claim of recognition of title rather than
an offhand allegation."). Id. at 499.

53. While "[p]ublic things are owned by the state or its political subdivisions in their
capacity as public persons," La. Civ. Code art. 450, private things subject to public use
are "things owned by ... private persons, and by the state or its political subdivisions
in their capacity as private persons," La. Civ. Code art. 453. See also La. Civ. Code
art. 455, comment b of article 455: "In Louisiana decisions, private things subject to
public use are frequently termed 'public things.' . . . These things, however, are not
necessarily public things . . . in the sense of Article 450, (1978). They are 'public' merely
in the sense that they are destined or dedicated to public use (respublicae usui destinatae)."
La. Civ. Code art. 455, comment b.
54. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 50, § 55, at 164 ("on principle, the riparian owner
retains all prerogatives of ownership that are not incompatible with public use.").
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his action is allowed to proceed further. It is submitted that, for reasons
explained below, such an interpretation must be rejected.
The plaintiff's burden of proof in a possessory action is defined by
Code of Civil Procedure article 3658.11 Neither this article, nor any of
the other pertinent articles of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Civil
Code, the Revised Statutes, or the Constitution differentiate between
possessory actions brought against the state and actions brought against
private defendants.16 If anything, the contrary command is contained in
the Revised Statutes which provide that "[aill procedural questions arising in suits on claims against the state . . . shall be determined, except
as the contrary is specified in this Part, in accordance with the rules
of law applicable to suits between private parties." 7 To increase the
plaintiff's burden of proof merely because the suit is brought against
the state is to create a procedural advantage in favor of the state which
is not authorized by the existing statutory scheme pertaining to real
actions and which, as the Todd majority has effectively demonstrated,
is not warranted by any public policy consideration. By proving his acts
of corporeal possession the plaintiff has effectively demonstrated that
the thing is physically susceptible to possession. Because "this factual
state of affairs is generally conformable to the legal state of affairs,""
the burden of overcoming that "presumption" should rest with the party
that denies it rather than the other way around. In the absence of a
statutory provision to the contrary, the possessor should not be required
to prove affirmatively that the thing he possesses physically is also legally
susceptible to possession. Whenever such requirement was felt necessary,
it has been expressly provided for by legislation, such as in Civil Code
article 3475 which requires that the person asserting acquisitive prescription must prove, among other things, that the thing is "susceptible of
acquisition by prescription. "5 9 It would be more fitting to consider the
"insusceptibility of the thing to possession" as an exception of no cause
of action, to be proven by the party who asserts the exception, rather

55.

La. Code Civ. P. art. 3658 provides as follows:
To maintain the possessory action the possessor must allege and prove that:
(1) He had possession of the immovable property or real right therein at the
time the disturbance occurred;
(2) He and his ancestors in title had such possession quietly and without
interruption for more than a year immediately prior to the disturbance, unless
evicted by force or fraud;
(3) The disturbance was one in fact or in law, as defined in Article 3659;
and
(4) The possessory action was instituted within a year of the disturbance.
56. See Symeonides, supra note 3, at 508.
57. La. R.S. 13:5103 (Supp. 1985).
58. 1 M. Planiol, supra note 20.
59. La. Civ. Code art. 3475.
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than to make susceptibility to possession an element of the cause of
action to be proven by the party who files the action. After all, private
things are the residual and by far the largest category. Things that are
not expressly declared by law to be common or public are necessarily
private. 60 If any presumption is applicable on this issue, it is that things
are presumed to be private, unless proven to be public or common, and
not the other way around. The burden of rebutting that presumption
must rest with the party who denies it.61
Moreover, as the court pointed out in Todd, "[a] party bringing a
possessory action need not allege or prove that the property is not owned
by the defendant, nor that he has title to the land; nor must the Court
' 62
address the matter of ownership in order to rule in a possessory action."
In fact, the plaintiff in a possessory action must be careful not to assert
his title in a way that exceeds the confines of Code of Civil Procedure
article 3661 ,63 lest he may be considered as having waived his possessory
action under article 36 5 7(l). 64 Admittedly, in many cases proof that the
disputed property is not a public thing is not the same as proof that
the property is not owned by the state, because the state may own the
property in its private capacity. Also, in some cases, the plaintiff may
be able to prove that the disputed property is not a public thing, without

60. This argument is not only supported by actual experience but also by the arrangement of the pertinent Civil Code articles. Book I of the Civil Code begins by
enunciating the division of things into common, public, and private (art. 448), then
defines, and gives examples of, common things (art. 449) and then defines, and gives
examples of, public things (art. 450); see also, supra note 11.Then follows La. Civ. Code
art. 453, which merely defines some of the attributes of private things without attempting
to give a complete definition or to give examples thereof. This omission can only be
explained by the fact that private things are viewed by the Code as the residual category.
Cf.-La. Civ. Code art. 475 ("All things . ..that the law does not consider as immovables,
are movables.").
61. Support for this proposition may also be provided from a seemingly unrelated
article of the Civil Code, article 730, which provides that "[d]oubt as to the existence
... of a . . . servitude shall be resolved in favor of the servient estate." Despite its
narrow language, this article is a concrete expression of the much broader civilian principle
that ownership is presumed to be free of burdens. This principle is pertinent to the issue
under discussion because the difference between private and public things of the state
essentially boils down to the servitude of public use. While public things are by definition
subject to public use, see La. Civ. Code art. 452, private things, other than the banks
of navigable rivers, belonging to the state or to private persons, "may be subject to
public use .. . by dedication," La. Civ. Code art. 455 (emphasis added). Either way,
the burden of proving the "existence

. . . of a . . . servitude"

of public use rests with

the party that asserts it, see La. Civ. Code art. 730.
62. 456 So. 2d at 1350.
63. La. Code Civ. P. art. 366 (reproduced supra note 38).
64. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3657(1) reads in part as follows: "The plaintiff may not
cumulate the petitory and the possessory actions in the same suit or plead them in the
alternative, and when he does so he waives the possessory action."
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asserting his own title and thus potentially waiving his possessory action.
For instance, the plaintiff might prove voluntarily that the disputed
property lies above the ordinary low water mark of a navigable river; 65
or that it is not covered by "the waters of the sea . . . in the highest
tide during the winter season;" '66 or that the inland waters covering the
property are not presently navigable. However, to require the plaintiff
to carry this burden in a possessory action would not only unjustifiably
increase his burden of proof as provided in the existing statutory scheme,
but would also be contrary to the well established jurisprudential rule
that navigability must be proven by the party who asserts it rather than
the party who denies it.67 More importantly perhaps, in many cases the
plaintiff may have no way of proving that the disputed property is not
a public thing without proving that he himself owns it. Suppose, for
instance, that the disputed property which is possessed by the plaintiff
is claimed by the state as forming part of a public park, a public
cemetery, a public square, or a public road. To require the plaintiff to
prove that the disputed property is not a public thing is to require him
to prove that the property is not contained in the state's title. In many
cases it will be impossible for him to do so without asserting his own
title and proving that the property is included in that title. However,
such assertion exceeds the confines of Code of Civil Procedure article
3661,68 and, unless the court is prepared to take a more liberal view,
would amount to a waiver of the possessory action. In such case, Todd
would be nothing but Pyrrhic victory for private plaintiffs.
The same analysis should apply in any other real action involving
the state where the private litigant is found to be in possession. 69 Since
Todd was a possessory action, the court did not have to resolve this
issue. However the court did inquire into "the type of burden which
the state has to bear after losing a possessory lawsuit if it chooses to
litigate the question of its ownership."' 0 After explaining what this
burden would be in the case of private litigants, the court stopped short
of saying-and in fact appeared to doubt"-that the burden would be
the same in cases involving the state. The court did not rule on this

65. See La. Civ. Code art. 456.
66. La. Civ. Code art. 451.
67. "Navigability is not presumed; the burden of proof rests with the party seeking
to establish it." State v. Two O'Clock Bayou Land Co., 365 So. 2d 1174, 1177 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1974) (citing earlier jurisprudence).

68.
69.
70.
71.

See
See
456
See

supra note 38.
supra note 44.
So. 2d at 1351.
id. at 1352 n.18 "Even if this Court were to decide later that the state, just

like the private litigant in Pure Oil v. Skinner, has a heavy burden in a petitory action
or other real action involving the ownership of property, following an unfavorable judgment
in a possessory action (and this is mere speculation at this point), ... ").
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"not entirely clear ' 7 2 issue which, after all, was "not before us at this
time, in this case." 73 Indeed, the issue was not before the court, and
the court was wise to avoid a ruling in that regard. However, even
before, and especially after Todd, there is little room for doubting that
the state's burden in these cases should be to prove "ownership" rather
than merely "better title." ' 74 The basic thrust of Todd is that, at least
with regard to private things, their adverse possession produces in favor
of the possessor all its legal effects, except prescription. As the preceding
discussion has demonstrated, the same must be true with regard to public
things, for until the state proves that they are indeed public we cannot
assume that they are. Among these effects is the possessor's "right to
possess" involved in Todd, as well as the right involved here, i.e., the
right to place on his adversary the burden of proving ownership rather
than merely a "better title." The same rationale is applicable to other
ownership actions, such as a petitory action filed by the state but not
preceded by a possessory action, an action for a declaratory judgment
filed by either side, or concursus proceedings. If, in any of these actions,
the private litigant is found to be in possession, the state's burden should
be to prove ownership rather than better title.
The question of how the state can prove ownership is, of course,
answered by Civil Code article 531 and Code of Civil Procedure articles
3653 and 3654, i.e., the same articles that apply to private defendants.
In other words, the state must prove that it "has acquired ownership
from a previous owner or by acquisitive prescription.""75 The words
"ownership from a previous owner" are ample enough to encompass
not just voluntary transfers, but also expropriations, accession, dedication
to public use, and any other means of acquisition of ownership "not
'76
the least of which is the ownership of lands at the state's inception."
If the above discussion is correct, the following conclusions may be
drawn from Todd: (1) a possessory action brought against the state
should be treated like any other possessory action brought against private
defendants; (2) the plaintiff's burden of proof is the same as provided
for in the Code of Civil Procedure article 3658, and no more; (3)
specifically, the plaintiff should not be required to prove that the disputed
property is not a public thing and thus susceptible to possession; (4)
that burden should rest with the state, if it chooses to assert it; (5)
depending on how the state phrases its pleadings, its assertion that the
disputed property is a public thing might be either a defense to the

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 1352.
Id.
La. Civ. Code art. 531; La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3653, 3654.
La. Civ. Code art. 531; see also La. Code Civ. P. art. 3653, 3654.
456 So. 2d at 1352.
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possessory action, or may amount to converting the suit into a petitory
action and judicially confessing the plaintiff's possession;77 (6) if the state
so converts the action into petitory, its burden would be to prove
ownership rather than merely better title, since its adversary is factually
and legally in possession; (7) the same burden, i.e., proving ownership
rather than better title, should be borne by the state in any other real
action in which the private litigant is found to be in possession;79 and
(8) the state may prove ownership, by proving, like any other litigant,
either prescription or acquisition of ownership by voluntary transfer,
expropriation, accession, dedication to public use and any other mode
of acquiring ownership "not the least of which is the ownership of
79
lands at the state's inception."
Legislative Intervention?
This discussion has been confined within the existing statutory scheme
regulating real actions. The gist of the discussion is that this scheme
does not warrant and does not permit a different treatment between
actions involving the state and actions involving solely private litigants.
To differentiate between such actions by judicial fiat would be to invidiously discriminate against private litigants without any compelling
public policy reason. More importantly, it would erode the historic role
of possession as arbiter of the burden of proof in real actions.
This is not to say that the existing statutory scheme is perfect. But
its defects are mostly its rigidity, inefficiency, and slowness, rather than
its equality of treatment of public and private litigants. Perhaps the
time has come to think of bold ways of enhancing the efficiency and
flexibility of the system by reducing its rigidity and technicality. In 1960,
the redactors of the Code of Civil Procedure took the long overdue
step of merging some real actions and simplyifying the rest. 80 Perhaps
now is the time for the most drastic step of merging all real actions
into one civil action, of abolishing, in other words, not only in theory
but in practice as well, these "forms of actions" that still dominate
our way of thinking. While it is true that these actions originate in the
classical Roman law, it is also true that much has happened since then,
as a result of which there is little civilian about a rigid separation of
actions which has been, with only slight exaggeration, compared to a
"writ system." 8' It is time, for instance, to reconsider whether the rigid

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
L. Rev.

See supra note 64.
See supra note 64.
See supra note 76.
See La. Code Civ. P., Bk. VII, tit. II, Introduction.
See Hubert, A Louisiana Anomaly-The "Writ" System in Real Actions, 22 Tul.
459 (1948).

19861

PROPERTY

separation of the possessory and petitory actions by the Code of Civil
Procedure has outlasted its usefulness. Its claimed advantage of "keep[ing]
the trial of the issues of possession and ownership as separate as possible" 2
may make it attractive to simple minds, and easy to teach to law school
freshmen, but is hardly conducive to a speedy and efficient resolution
of real property disputes. Although this subject calls for much more
thought than can be devoted to it in the context of a symposium article,
one could venture a tentative assertion, if only for purposes of provoking
some discussion-that not much harm would befall the system if the
possessory and petitory actions were combined into a single action,
provided, of course, that possession retains its traditional and extremely
important role of the arbiter of the burden of proof.83
This same proviso should be kept in mind in any attempt to reenact Louisiana Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 13:5061 which was repealed,
perhaps inadvertently,84 in 1960. La. R.S. 13:5061 required the compulsory cumulation of the possessory and petitory actions with regard
to property claimed by the state to be locus publicus, i.e., a public
thing.85 The Todd court assumed that in such a petitory action "the
burden of proving title would rest on that party as plaintiff, rather than
on the state as defendant. 8 6 This assumption would be true if the real
action cumulated with the possessory action was the true petitory action,
which presupposes that the plaintiff "is not in possession. ' 8 7 Even then,
however, this does not presuppose that the state-defendant is in possession, and, if the state is not actually in possession, the plaintiff's

82. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3657 comment (a).
83. "It is, indeed, possible to have one real action and to preserve the substantive
effects of possession." A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 50, § 190, at 513-14 (footnotes
omitted).
84. See Symeonides, supra note 3, at 508 n.18.
85. La. R.S. 13:5061 (1951) provided as follows:
Whenever the state, a municipality, town or village thereof, is sued as a
defendant in a possessory action brought by any person, firm, or corporation
claiming to possess as owner, usufructuary, or claiming a real right to property,
which is also claimed by the state, a municipality, town or village thereof, to
be public property constituting a locus publicus, then, in such cases the possessory
and petitory actions shall be cumulated and the claim of title or real right vel
non, of the person, firm, or corporation bringing such possessory action shall
be tried contradictorily with the claim of title of the state, municipality, town,
or village thereof, and any judgment rendered on the petitory phase of such
suit shall carry with it a determination of the possessory action in favor of the
party whose petitory claim has been affirmed and recognized. All such cumulated
actions of the character herein described shall be tried in preference in all courts.
For a discussion of this provision, see 456 So. 2d at 1344-45; 474 So. 2d at 432 n.2;
Symeonides, supra note 3, at 507-08.
86. 456 So. 2d at 1352 n.18.
87. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3651.
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burden would be to merely prove better title than the state's.88 However,
a careful plaintiff who is in possession of property claimed by the state
as locus publicus would have enough sense to bring an action for a
declaratory judgment which does not presuppose that he is out of
possession.8 9 In such an action, judgment is rendered in favor of the
party who is found in posession unless the other party proves ownership. 90 Whether La. R.S. 13:5061 was intended to deprive the plaintiff
of this action is not known, since there is no recorded legislative history,
and the only reported case 9l applying this statute is not enlightening on
this issue. It is more likely that the statute used the term "petitory
action" in its broader, generic meaning of an ownership action, rather
than its narrower, technical sense of that particular real action in which
the plaintiff is not in possession. Otherwise, the statute would have the
effect of reducing to zero the effects of private possession of property
"claimed by the state

. . .

to be

. .

. locus publicus.

' 92

Such an important

consequence could not have been hidden under such technical language.
In any event, if that was the true intent of the statute, it should be
stated expressly if the statute is to be reenacted. For reasons explained
earlier, this author would opt for the opposite solution of retaining
possession as the arbiter of the burden of proof, so that the possessor
should be entitled to judgment unless the other party proves ownership.
If this premise is accepted the reenactment of the statute may well be
unnecessary. At the same time, if this premise is accepted the statute
may be safely extended even to private things claimed by the state.
POSSESSORY PROTECTION OF SERVITUDES

According to Civil Code article 3421, quasi-possession, that is, "[tihe
exercise of a real right, such as a servitude, with the intent to have it
as one's own" is governed by the rules of possession applicable by
analogy. Among these rules are articles 3655 to 3663 of the Code of
Civil Procedure providing for the possessory action. These articles make
the possessory action available not only for the protection "of [corporeal]
immovable property" but also for the protection "of a real right therein."
Thus, there should be no question that the quasi-possessor of a servitude
has an action "to be maintained in his . . . enjoyment of the right
when he has been disturbed, or to be restored to the . . . enjoyment

88. See the last sentence of La. Code Civ. P. art. 3653(2) and La. Civ. Code art.
531 both of which provide that, in a petitory action, when neither party is in possession,
the plaintiff's burden is to prove better title than the defendant.
89. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 3654.
90. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 3654(1).
91. See Begnaud v. Grubb & Hawkins, 209 La. 826, 25 So. 2d 606 (1946).
92. La. R.S. 13:5061 (Supp. 1985).

1986]

PROPERTY

thereof when he has been evicted." 93 It should be equally clear that a
plaintiff who meets the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure article
365894 (quasi-possession of the servitude at the time of, and for over a
year preceding, the disturbance, and filing of the action within a year
therefrom) should prevail without being required to prove that he is
legally entitled to the claimed servitude by virtue of title or prescription.
After all, according to article 3661, "[i]n the possessory action, the ...
title of the parties to the ... real right ... is not at issue."
Clear as though these rules of positive law might be, they were
disregarded by the trial court in Babineaux v. Theriot.95 Despite its
findings that the plaintiff had met the requirements of article 3658, the
district court dismissed his possessory action for failure to prove that
he had acquired the servitude of passage by title or prescription.9 The
court of appeals reversed, using memorable language which exhibits a
clear understanding of the difference between "ownership of a real right
... [and] possession of a real right." 97 The court stated emphatically:
The plaintiff was not required to prove that he had acquired
a real right . . . before being able to maintain a possessory
action. If this were so, one could never possess a real right that
he did not own, and it would follow that he could never acquire
any real right through acquisitive prescription. Under C.C.P.
art. 3658 a possessor need only prove that he had possession
of the real right for a year prior to the disturbance, not that
he has acquired the real right. Once a person shows he has
possessed the real right as required by C.C.P. art. 3658, he has
proved his right to possess. 98
An equally clear understanding of the issues is exhibited by the
decision of the supreme court in Kizer v. Liily, 99 which involved almost
identical facts as Babineaux. Although the court eventually divided 4
to 3, six members of the court adhered to the principle that the possessory
action is available for the protection of the quasi-possession of a servitude
of passage independently from title or prescription.-° Kizer also involved

93. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3655.
94. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3658, reproduced supra note 55.
95. 465 So. 2d 290 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
96. Id. at 292.
97. Id.at 291.
98. Id.at 292.
99. 471 So. 2d 716 (La. 1985).
100. At least two of the three dissenting Justices (Chief Justice Dixon in an opinion
joined by Justice Marcus) agreed with the plurality opinion written by Justice Watson
and the concurring opinion of Justice Lemmon on the proposition stated in the text. In
fact, according to Justice Lemmon, see id. at 721, the court's ruling on this issue was
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two additional issues not raised in Babineaux. One was the question of
the plaintiff's intent to possess the servitude as her own. Three justices
felt that such intent should be shown affirmatively by plaintiff,'0 ' and
that "[pilaintiff's mere intermittent passage over the gravel road without
more, is not sufficient to show an intent to become owner of a real
right to use the road."'' 0 2 While this might be a factual issue on which
one cannot have an opinion without seeing the record, the other four
justices were correct to point out that "there is a presumption that one
intends to possess as owner."'0 3 It should therefore be the defendant's
burden to rebut the presumption rather than the plaintiff's burden to
confirm it.
The other issue involved in Kizer was the continuity of the plaintiff's
possession. Because the servitude of passage is a discontinuous servitude
under the pre-1977 classification of servitudes,' °4 it could be argued that
plaintiff's possession of it suffered from the vice of discontinuity. 05
This argument was implicitly rejected by the plurality and the concurring
opinions which held that, regardless of its classification as discontinuous,
a servitude is possessed continuously when exercised " 'on a regular
basis,' i.e., at regular intervals.' ' 0 6 Indeed, despite what the term discontinuous servitude might suggest to a layman, its technical meaning
had little to do with continuity of possession, but rather with whether
the servitude in question was "such as need the act of man to be

unanimous. However, Justice Blanche seems to disagree when he dissents in a separate
opinion on the ground that "[pilaintiff does not allege . . . that her possession of the
right of passage over the defendant's land is that of owner, either by title, destination
of the owner, or by acquisitive prescription." Id. at 723. Had it stopped at the word
"owner," the sentence would have meant that, like Chief Justice Dixon and Justice
Marcus, see infra note 101, Justice Blanche was simply not convinced that plaintiff had
exhibited the requisite intent to possess the right as owner, which is what distinguishes
true possession, here quasi-possession, from precarious possession. However, the balance
of the sentence, as well as of the opinion, suggests, that its author appears to consider
title and the other means of acquiring a real right as a prerequisite for possessing the
right as owner.
101. See the dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Dixon, joined by Justice Marcus, id.
at 722-23. For Justice Blanche, see supra note 100.
102. Id. at 723 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 719 (Watson, J., writing for the court), citing La. Civ. Code art. 3427
which provides that "[olne is presumed to intend to possess as owner unless he began
in the name of and for another."
104. See article 727 of the Civil Code of 1870, in force until 1977, which provided
that "[d]iscontinuous servitudes are such as need the act of man to be exercised. Such
are the rights of passage, of drawing water, pasture and the like."
105. According to La. Civ. Code art. 3435: " Possession that is ...
discontinuous
... has no legal effect."
106. 471 So. 2d at 719.
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exercised."' ' 0 A servitude of drain or drip is continuous,,08 although not
exercised continuously but only when it rains. A servitude of drawing
water, on the other hand, is discontinuous because, although water may
be drawn every day, it can only be drawn by the "act of man."' 9
However, the discontinuous character of the servitude of passage
involved in Kizer is not devoid of any significance. Under pre-1977 law,
discontinuous servitudes could not be acquired by prescription."' Under
post-1977 law, which abolished the distinction of servitudes into continuous and discontinuous,"' formerly discontinuous servitudes may be
12
acquired by prescription, provided they qualify as apparent servitudes. 1
However, the fact that the new law does not apply retroactively," 3
coupled with the fact that there are not enough years since 1977 for a
servitude to be acquired by prescription, gives rise to a seemingly anomalous phenomenon similar to that involved in Todd: one may be possessing something that he cannot, for the time being, acquire by
prescription."14 However, this phenomenon is anomalous only when we
assume that the possessor does not own what he possesses. As explained
earlier, such an assumption simply cannot be made in a possessory
action. As in Todd, the existence of the real right can only be decided
in a subsequent petitory or similar action. Although in all three cases
the plaintiff cannot benefit from acquisitive prescription-in Todd forever, and in Babineaux and Kizer for the time being-the possibility of
proving ownership by title should not be discarded." 5 If the plaintiffs
are able to do so, the temporary protection obtained through the possessory action will be consolidated by the protection accorded by a
successful ownership action. If not, then the temporary protection of
the possessory action will give way to the superior real rights of the
possessor's adversary. This is the way the system was meant to work

107. La. Civ. Code art. 727 (1870) (in force until 1977). See supra note 105.
108. See, e.g., Livingston Parish Police Jury v. Smith, 442 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1983).
109. See, e.g., Norton v. Thorne, 446 So. 2d 972 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
110. See La. Civ. Code art. 766 (1870) (in force until 1977).
111. See 1977 La. Acts No. 514, Expose des Motifs.
112. See La. Civ. Code arts. 740, 742.
113. See 1977 La. Acts No. 514, § 7; Smith, 442 So. 2d 529; Norton, 446 So. 2d
972; A. Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes § 2, in 4 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1983).
114. Cf. Justice Blanche's statement on rehearing in Todd: "it would be a useless
exercise first to give judicial recognition to a plaintiff's right to possess against the state
and then later tell him that his possession will never be sufficient to acquire ownership."
456 So. 2d at 1359.
115. Being possessory actions, the three cases do not, and should not, contain sufficient
information as to whether the plaintiffs would ultimately be able to prove title. Nevertheless, on the basis of the available facts, it seems that while Mrs. Kizer may lack title,
Mr. Todd, and to a lesser extent Mr. Babineaux, have a good chance of proving title
when called upon to do so in the appropriate action.
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or not work. If there is an anomaly here, it is not because the issues
of possession and ownership of the real right will be adjudicated in two
separate proceedings. The anomaly may lie in the fact that, unlike Todd,
where, as suggested earlier, 1 6 the possessor should enjoy the procedural
advantage of placing on his adversary the burden of proving ownership,
the quasi-possessor of the servitude in Babineaux and Kizer may not
be entitled fully to that advantage. The reasons for this difference will
be explained shortly in the following pages exploring the hypothetical
aftermath of Kizer.' 7
Before doing so, however, it may be worth pausing for a hypothetical
question that was not raised in either Kizer or Babineaux. In neither
of the two cases did the plaintiff request the relief accorded by Code
of Civil Procedure article 3662(2) to successful plaintiffs in a possessory
action, namely that the defendant be ordered "to assert his adverse
claim of ownership of the immovable property or real right therein in
a petitory action to be filed within . . . sixty days." If this relief is
available to a plaintiff in a possessory action for the protection of a
servitude, then the defendant who fails to comply with the order within
the prescribed time would "be precluded thereafter," not "from asserting
the ownership" of the strip of land over which the servitude is exercised,
but rather from asserting the lack of a servitude burdening that strip.
However, after Todd, there is reason to doubt whether this relief is
available at all to the quasi-possessor of a servitude which, although
apparent, is discontinuous and thus, for the time being, insusceptible
of being acquired by prescription. The analogy with Todd lies in the
fact that in both cases the defendant cannot lose property by prescription.
Arguably, therefore, the defendant should not be pushed into losing
that same property through the sixty day delay of article 3662(2). The
analogy may be weakened, however, by the fact that Todd's holding
on this issue was "[miore pointedly ... based on the constitutional
'proscription to the running of liberative prescription against the state,"'' 8
and that similar protection is not available to the private defendants in
Kizer and Babineaux. Be that as it may, both defendants would have
every incentive to file voluntarily the appropriate action well before
acquisitive prescription accrues against them. When they decide to do
so, the following two questions will have to be answered: (a) What is
the appropriate action, and (b) what is the plaintiff's burden of proof.
The following is an attempt to answer them.

116. See supra text accompanying notes 55-66.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 119-47.
118. 456 So. 2d at 1352.
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The Hypothetical Aftermath of Kizer
The first question can be answered easily. In other civil law systems,
the appropriate action would be the so-called negatory action, in which
the plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring his ownership to be free of
burdens, such as servitudes or other real rights." 9 In Louisiana, the
negatory action is not expressly recognized as a nominate real action,
but similar results may be obtained through an analogical application
of the article of the Code of Civil Procedure pertaining to the action
for a declaratory judgment.12 0 To avoid confusion, this action will be
hereinafter referred to as a negatory action.
The question about the burden of proof is more difficult. In a very
thoughtful concurring opinion in Kizer, Justice Lemmon tentatively addressed this issue, and suggested that, in a subsequent (negatory) action,
the plaintiff would have to prove "that he owns the immovable property
free of the claimed servitude,"'' i.e., "that no servitude has been
' 22
established by title, by destination, or by acquisitive prescription."'
This statement sounds inherently logical, but upon closer examination
some qualifications might be necessary.
The first question is whether, in the negatory action, the plaintiff
should have to prove ownership of the part of the land over which the
claimed servitude is exercised. The reason this question is asked is because
the direct objective of a negatory action is to determine the existence
or nonexistence, validity, and scope of the claimed servitude, rather
than the ownership of the underlying land. Yet, for obvious reasons,
title to such land must be a prerequisite for bringing the negatory action.
A person who does not assert title to the allegedly servient estate should
have no right or standing to complain about burdens thereon. But title
and ownership may be two different things.12 A title may be a "perfect"
title, in which case it is ownership, or according to the old expression
"good against the world," or it may be something less than perfect,
i.e., merely a "just title'' 2 4 or a "better" title. 125 It is submitted that,

119. In Germany and Greece, the negatory action is expressly provided for in civil
code provisions, while in France it has been recognized by the jurisprudence and doctrine.
For the history and function of the negatory action in these three systems, as well as in
the Roman law from where the action originates, see 2 A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 50
at § 222.
120. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 3654; 2 A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 50, § 219, at
586.
121. 471 So. 2d at 722.
122. Id.
123. For the various meanings of the word "title" see 2 A. Yiannopoulos, supra note
59, § 192, at 517-18.
124. For the meaning of the term "just title," see La. Civ. Code art. 3483 and former
La. Civ. Code arts. 3483-86. In the context of these articles,
a just title
is lessthan

676
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in a negatory action, the plaintiff's burden should not be to prove
perfect title or ownership, but rather a "better title" as this term is
used in Civil Code article 531 and Code of Civil Procedure article 3654.
The reason has to do with the defendant's lack of possession and title.

The defendant, i.e., the person exercising the claimed servitude, is in
quasi-possession of the incorporeal thing we call a servitude, but is not

in possession of the corporeal immovable over which the claimed servitude is exercised. A person exercising a servitude of drawing water
quasi-possesses the servitude, but does not possess the land on which
the well is located. This distinction may be more difficult to detect in

a case like Kizer involving a servitude of passage which is exercised
through acts similar or identical to acts by which corporeal property is
possessed. 2 6 The distinction is nevertheless important, and the very fact
that Mrs. Kizer claimed only quasi-possession of the servitude rather
than possession of the strip of land over which the passage was exercised

is, at least, an implicit acknowledgment that she did not [intend to]
possess the strip itself. If a true petitory action, or an action for a
declaratory judgment, were to be brought against Mrs. Kizer, the plaintiff's burden of proof would be to prove "better title" rather than
ownership." 7 There is no reason why this burden should be increased
in a negatory action where, after all, the ownership of the strip is not

even the primary issue. A "better title" should suffice, and, in this
case, any title by the plaintiff is a "better title", simply because, by

perfect because it stems from someone who is not an owner or who lacks the power of
alienation. See former La. Civ. Code art. 3485.
125. The term "better title" is used but not defined in La. Civ. Code art. 531 and
La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3653, 3654. Although a "better title" may well be a perfect title,
it need not be so. Under the conditions specified in these articles, the party with the "better
title" prevails, without being required to prove that his title is in fact perfect, i.e., without
being required to prove that he has acquired ownership from a previous owner or by
acquisitive prescription. See La. Civ. Code art. 531; La. Code Civ. P. art. 3653, 3654.
126. For a recent similar case where the court did make the distinction between
possession and quasi-possession, see Faust v. Mitchell Energy Corp., 437 So. 2d 339 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1983). Faust was a concursus proceeding for the mineral proceeds of a unit
which included a tract of land used as a cemetery since 1800. One of the claimants, the
"Cemetery Association" claimed possession of and ownership by prescription of the
cemetery. In responding to this claim the court distinguished between the Association's
possession "for cemetery purposes" from possession "as it relates to the land itself and
the incidents of ownership thereof including the mineral rights." Id. at 342-43. The court
found that while the Association was exercising the first kind of possession [actually quasipossession] "as owner," its exercise of the second kind of possession was precarious in
nature. Being precarious, this possession could not lead to acquisitive prescription, and
was also insufficient to place on the Association's adversary the burden of proving
"ownership" under La. Code Civ. P. art. 3654(1). The latter could thus prevail by showing
"better title" under La. Code Civ. P. art. 3654(2).
127. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 3653(2); La. Civ. Code art. 531, last sent.; Faust, 437
So. 2d 339.
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definition, the defendant has no title at all. The reason the defendant
cannot have title to the strip is because, if he had such a title, he could
not claim a servitude in the first place. Neminem res sua servit (One
28
cannot have a servitude on his own land).'
The second question is whether, after having proved his title, i.e.,
prima facie ownership of the [allegedly servient] estate, the plaintiff
should also have to prove that the estate is not in fact servient, or, as
Justice Lemmon put it, "free of the claimed servitude."' 29 An affirmative
answer to this question would mean that the plaintiff would be required
1
Justice Porter resolved
to prove a negative proposition. In an 1822 case, 30
the similar question of the burden of proving the use of a servitude
for purposes of the prescription of nonuse by placing the burden on
the owner of the dominant rather than the servient estate. Citing a
provision of the Siete Partidas, Justice Porter said that "where the
affirmative involves a negative, the burden of proof is thrown on the
opposite party, because a negative cannot be proved."'' This solution
was subsequently codified in what is now article 764 of the Civil Code'32
and should apply by analogy here, supported also by the general civilian
principle that ownership is presumed to be free of burdens.' 33 Thus, the
burden of proving that a servitude came into existence should rest with
Mrs. Kizer, not Mr. Lilly. This solution is supported by the weight of
doctrinal authority, including Yiannopoulos,'34 Planiol and Ripert,' 35 and
Aubry and Rau. 3 6 According to these authorities, because ownership is
presumed to be free of burdens,' a1 the burden of proving the existence
of the claimed servitude rests with the defendant rather than the plaintiff

128. See La. Civ. Code arts. 646, 765; A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 113, at § 142.
129. See supra note 121.
130. Powers v. Foucher, 12 Mart. (o.s.) 70 (La. 1822).
131. Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
132. La. Civ. Code art. 764 provides that once the prescription of non-use is pleaded,
the burden of proving the use of the servitude rests with the owner of the dominant
estate. For a full discussion of this article, see A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 113, at §
169. Professor Yiannopoulos suggests correctly that the article should apply to affirmative
servitudes only, not to negative servitudes. See id. at 452.
133. See supra note 61; infra note 137.
134. See A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 50, § 219, at 587-88; A. Yiannopoulos, supra
note 113, § 186, at 487-88.
135. See 3 M. Planiol & G. Ripert, Traite Pratique De Droit Civil Francais 973 (2d
ed. Picard 1952).
136. 2 C. Aubry & C. Rau, Droit Civil Francais § 219, at 379-80, in 2 Civil Law
Translations (J. Mayda trans. 1966).
137. According to A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 50 at nn. 454, 14 respectively, "[tlhe
principle that ownership is presumed to be free of burdens is implict in the Louisiana
Civil Code" (citing La. Civ. Code art. 730 which is reproduced supra note 61).
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in the negatory action.' Aubry and Rau, as well as Planiol and Ripert,
state expressly that "[ilt
is the same when the defendant obtains judgment
in a possessory action that maintains him in the possession of the
servitude." 3 9
If this analysis is accepted, Justice Lemmon's misgivings about "the
effect and the value of the judgment that a plaintiff receives in a
possessory action to maintain possession of a servitude"'' 0 become more
understandable, and so does the reluctance of some other members of
the court and of the lower courts to allow the possessory action in the
first place. For, if this plaintiff is later sued in a negatory action he
can draw virtually no procedural advantages from his prior victory in
the possessory action. The contrast with a similarly situated possessor
of corporeal property is obvious. As Professor Yiannopoulos explains:
A possessor of a corporeal immovable who has satisfied the
requisites of Article 3658 of the Code of Civil Procedure will
remain in possession unless the owner of the immovable proves
his ownership in a petitory action. In contrast, the possessor of
a servitude who has satisfied the requisites of Article 3658 of
the Code of Civil Procedure will eventually be evicted unless
he proves the existence of the servitude. This is not an odd
proposition. The possessory action protects the possession of an
immovable, whether corporeal or incorporeal, and presupposes
the existence of the thing possessed. The existence of a corporeal
immovable is hardly ever in dispute but the existence of an
incorporeal immovable must be proven by the plaintiff who
4
claims that he is entitled to its possession.' '
Whatever the reasons and need for a different treatment between possessors and quasi-possessors, its detrimental effects on the efficiency of
the system should not be disregarded. It would certainly be more efficient
if both questions, that is, the quasi-possession of the servitude and its
existence, could be resolved in one proceeding. Two solutions come to
mind, but there are certainly more and probably better ones. The first,

138. See A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 50, § 219, at 587 ("The owner of the allegedly
servient estate is only required to prove his ownership; it is incumbent on his opponent
to prove the servitude or other real right that he claims."); M. Planiol & G. Ripert,
supra note 135, at 973 ("It suffices for the owner to prove his right of ownership; it is
incumbent upon his adversary, through defendant, to carry the burden of the existence
of the servitude because immovables are presumed to be free of burdens. It is the same
when the defendant obtains judgment in a possessory action that maintains him in the
possession of the servitude."); C. Aubry & C. Rau, supra note 136, at 379-80.
139. 3 M. Planiol & G. Ripert, supra note 135; see C. Aubry & C. Rau, supra note
136; A. Yiannapolos, supra note 50, § 219, at 587.
140. 471 So. 2d at 722.
141. A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 113, § 186, at 488.
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is to merge the possessory action for the protection of a servitude into
the confessory action, 42 that is, the innominate real action that seeks
a judgment declaring the existence of the claimed servitude, rather than
its mere exercise in fact. This solution would, in effect, amount to a
compulsory waiver of the possessory action and a requirement that the
person claiming the servitude prove its existence at the outset, in order
to have any chance for judicial protection. 43 This solution must be
rejected because, among other things, it reduces to zero the effect of
quasi-possession, thus depriving the plaintiff of an important tactical
weapon. The second solution is to merge the defense to the possessory
action into the negatory action. Unlike the previous solution, this one
does, not essentially deprive the defendant of the options he has under
the current system. The defendant could, as under the present system,
defend the possessory action either by denying the plaintiff's quasipossession, or by denying the existence of the servitude and asserting
his own title, in which case he converts the action into a negatory one
and judicially confesses the quasi-possession of the plaintiff.'" The difference lies in the fact that, under this tentatively suggested solution,
the defendant would have to assert his title, if, after having denied the
plaintiff's quasi-possession, the plaintiff was able to prove its exercise
for the requisite year. The fact that, as suggested earlier, the defendant
need only prove title rather than ownership, explains why the suggested
solution does not put the defendant in a worse position than he is under
the current law. If he has a title, he would prevail, unless the plaintiff
proves the existence of the servitude. 45 If he has no title, he is not a
proper object of judicial solicitude, and, in any event, he would not
prevail even under the current scheme. To recapitulate, the suggested
solution would work as follows: A person exercising a servitude would
have the same options in protecting its enjoyment as he has under the
current law. He could file either the confessory action, in which case

142. The confessory action is the opposite of the negatory action. For its history and
function see A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 50, at § 202.
143. This is in effect the solution followed by the trial court in Babineaux, see supra
note 96.
144. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 3657 (applicable by analogy); A. Yiannopoulos, supra
note 113, at § 186.
145. To be sure, proving the establishment of the servitude may not bring the matter
to an end, for there may well be an issue of extinction of the servitude by nonuse.
According to La'. Civ. Code art. 764, the owner of the dominant estate, here the plaintiff,
has the burden of proving that the servitude has not been extinguished by non-use.
However, according to Yiannopoulos, this article should be restricted to affirmative
servitudes only, and that "[t]he owner of the servient estate ought to have the burden
of extinction of a negative servitude by non-use." A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 113, §
186, at 489.
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he has the burden of proving the existence of the servitude,' 46 or he
could file a possessory action, in which case he has the burden of
proving quasi-possession of the servitude for a year preceding the disturbance.4 7 In the latter situation, his opponent, the defendant, must
assert and prove his title, and if he fails to do so he should be precluded
from litigating the issue in a subsequent proceeding against the same
plaintiff. If the defendant proves his title, the burden would shift back
to plaintiff who would have to prove the existence of the servitude.
The difference between this solution and the current system is that a
defendant who is defeated on the issue of quasi-possession of the servitude is forced to initiate the discussion of-though not to prove-the
servitude's existence in one and the same proceeding rather than waiting
to do so in a second proceeding. Since, as explained earlier, the burden
of proving the servitude's existence remains with the plaintiff, the defendant's positions remains essentially the same, while the system's efficiency
is enhanced.
PRECARIOUS POSSESSION

From Precariousto Adverse
Precarious Possessors Other than Co-owners
According to both the old and the new law of possession and
acquisitive prescription, once one begins possessing precariously he is
presumed to continue possessing in that capacity, although subjectively
he may intend to possess for himself. 4 This presumption has always
been rebuttable, but, with regard to precarious possessors other than
co-owners, it now takes more to rebut the presumption than it took
under the old law. 49 Although the old law admitted any "proof to the
contrary,"" 50 including, of course, actual notice, and the jurisprudence
spoke of "unequivocal acts of hostility,""' the new law requires that
the precarious possessor give "actual notice"' 52 of his intent to possess
for himself to the person on whose behalf he is possessing. In a number
of recent cases, precarious possessors sought unsuccessfully to rebut the

146. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 3653 (applicable by analogy).
147. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 3658 (applicable by analogy).
148. See La. Civ. Code art. 3489 (1870) (in force until January 1, 1983) and La. Civ.
Code art. 3438 (in force since January 1, 1983).
149. For the differences between the old and the new law on this issue see Symeonides,
supra note 26, at 85-87
150. La. Civ. Code art. 3489 (1870).
151. See, e.g., Succession of Zebriska, 119 La. 1076, 1091, 44 So. 893, 897 (1907).
152. La. Civ. Code arts. 3439, 3478.
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presumption of precariousness.' Unfortunately, none of these cases shed
much light on the meaning of "actual notice," either because the pertinent facts occured under the old law, or because of failure to notice
the difference between the old law and the new law on this issue. These
54
cases are nevertheless correctly decided, and, of them, Ramsey v. Pace'
is the most interesting.
In 1929, Pace's ancestor bought from his neighbor, Ramsey's ancestor, a rectangular tract of land described as "the northernmost 10 acres
of the NE/4 of the NE/4 of section 33."' 1 By a correction deed between
the same parties, this description was changed, in 1937, to a 10 acre
square tract described as the "NE/4 [of] NE/4 [of] NE/4 of section
33, '" 56 thus overlapping by five acres the original rectangular tract. The
five eastern acres of the 1929 deed coincided with the five northern
acres of the 1937 correction deed. In 1958, Pace constructed a fence
around the rectangular tract described in the 1929 deed. Left outside
this fence were the now disputed five southern acres of the square tract
described in the 1937 correction deed. The court held that, by fencingout these five acres, Pace had not abandoned his possession thereof
"because the record indicates he exercised his ownership thereafter. CC
34-18. He executed the mineral lease to Marshall in 1976. He executed
' 5
the right-of-way to SWEPCO in 1979. He paid taxes . . . since 1937.' 1
Although the court was correct in finding no abandonment of possession,
it should be clear that, whether or not there is abandonment of possession
should depend on the intent of the possessor and the surrounding
circumstances at the time of the alleged abandonment, i.e., the construction of the fence in 1958, and not eighteen years later.5 8 The court
also held that, since the five disputed southern acres were contained in
Pace's 1937 deed, his corporeal possession of the five northern acres
contained in the same deed served as constructive possession of the five
southern acres. 5 9 This was certainly true until 1978 when Pace possessed
(and owned) the five adjacent northern acres. During that year, however,
Pace sold the five northern acres to a third party, Marshall. 6° Whatever
possession Pace had retained of the five southern acres after 1978, it

153. See, e.g., James Harvey Ramsey Estate, Inc. v. Pace, 467 So. 2d 1202 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1985); Hammond v. Averett, 415 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); Succession
of Book, 426 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Hawthorne v. Succession of Hawthorne,
419 So. 2d 1295 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
154. 467 So. 2d 1202 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 472 So. 2d 918 (La. 1985).
155. Id. at 1205.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1207 (emphasis added).
158. For the meaning and consequences of abandonment of possession see Symeonides,
supra note 26, at 99-100.
159. 467 So. 2d at 1208. Cf. Avery v. Nash, 448 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
160. See 467 So. 2d at 1207 n.2.
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could not have been constructive but rather civil possession.' 6 Be that
as it may, the court's pronouncement on the issues of Pace's actual
and constructive possession should be characterized as dicta, since the
disposition of the case may rest more solidly on other grounds: By
virtue of the 1937 correction deed, Ramsey's ancestor had sold to Pace's
ancestor the five disputed acres and had warranted title and peaceful
possession thereof. According to well established jurisprudence, 62 "[tihe
retention of possession by the vendor makes him the presumed precarious
possessor for his vendee."'' 61 The same applies to the vendor's universal
successors, 164 such as plaintiff Ramsey, who, as the court held, are
"bound by the 1929-1937 warranty deeds, [and] legally acknowledge
Pace as owner."'' 65 Consequently, like any precarious possessor, Ramsey
could begin possessing for himself only by giving actual notice to Pace
(new law) or by exhibiting some "unequivocal acts of hostility" (old
law). 166 Ramsey's acts of possession of the disputed property consisted
of: painting a blue line on the trees on a line parallel to Pace's fence
in 1967, 1973 and 1979; t 67 "selectively" cutting timber from the disputed
property for one day in each of these three years; 6 and "periodically"
inspecting the property. 69 The court characterized these acts "relatively
equivocal, clandestine, and discontinuous."' ' 7 0 Obviously, however, the
court overstated its case. For, such acts are neither clandestine nor
discontinuous, and in the case of non-precarious possessors, such acts
may be sufficient, at least when accompanied by title, to commence
possession or to retain possession already acquired.' 7' However, since
Ramsey was a precarious possessor, the question was whether these acts
were sufficiently open and regular to rebut the presumption of precariousness, by bringing "to Pace's knowledge any unequivocal act of
hostility ... or actual notice of ... [Ramsey's] intent to possess adversely to Pace ....
-"72The court's answer to this question was negative, 73 and is correct, but both the question and the answer must be
confined to cases of precarious possessors.

161. See La. Civ. Code art. 3431; Symeonides, supra note 26, at 77.
162. See Frost Lumber Indus. v. Harrison, 215 La. 767, 41 So. 2d 674 (1949); Roe
v. Bundy's Heirs, 45 La. Ann. 398, 12 So. 759 (1893). Both these cases were relied upon

by the Ramsey court.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

467 So. 2d at 1208 (emphasis deleted).
See La. Civ. Code art. 3477.
467 So. 2d at 1208.
See supra notes 151-52.
See 467 So. 2d at 1206.
Id.
Id.at 1207.
Id.at 1210.
See, e.g., Antulovich v. Whitley, 289 So. 2d 174 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
467 So. 2d at 1210.
Id.
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Again the hypothetical aftermath of Ramsey promises to be at least
as interesting as the case itself. It is entirely predictable that Ramsey
will return with a possessory or perhaps a petitory action with regard
to the five eastern acres of the rectangular tract enclosed by Pace's
fence, and contained in the 1929 deed but not in the 1937 correction
deed.' 74 When this happens, "the shoe will be on the other foot." The
Ramsey court had held that the 1937 correction deed served as an
acknowledgement by the vendor that the property contained therein
belonged to the vendee.' 7 By the same token, this same correction deed
must serve as an acknowledgement by the vendee that he has no claims
to property not contained therein but contained in the 1929 corrected
deed. Thus, Pace's possession of the five eastern acres of the rectangular
tract which were not contained in the 1937 correction deed would have
to be precarious. Hence, the question will again be whether Pace's
subsequent activity was sufficient to rebut the presumption of precariousness. Since Pace's acts of possession of these five acres were less
ambiguous than Ramsey's acts of possession of the other five acres
involved in Ramsey (erecting a fence as opposed to painting a tree line,
regularly maintaining the enclosed property as opposed to "occasionally"
and "selectively" cutting timber), the question will undoubtedly be a
closer one, and this author has no intention of forejudging the court's
decision. The court will also have to inquire as to whether the standards
provided by the old and the new law differ not only in language but
also in substance, and, if so, which of the two should apply in this
case.
Co-owners
According to Civil Code articles 3439 and 3478, co-owners possessing precariously for other co-owners may rebut the presumption of
precariousness by showing something less than actual notice, namely,
"overt and unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice.' ' 76 But, according
to old jurisprudence which continues to be relevant, "mere occupancy,
use, payment of taxes, and similar acts of possession will not suffice
to give notice of adverse possession to an owner in common."' 7 7 This
jurisprudence was reaffirmed by Jenkins v. Blache, 78 and Boase v.
Edmonson.179 Civil Code article 3478, provides further that the recor-

174. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
176. For a discussion of this standard, see Symeonides, supra note 26, at 85-87.
177. Boase v. Edmonson, 471 So. 2d 847, 850 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985), citing Hodgeson
v. McDaniel, 233 La. 180, 96 So. 2d 481 (1957); Alba v. Smith, 228 La. 207, 81 So.
2d 863 (1955); Lee v. Jones, 224 La. 231, 69 So. 2d 26 (1953).
178. 471 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
179. 471 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
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dation by a co-owner of a "title from a person other than a co-owner"
is an "overt and unambiguous act sufficient to give notice to [the other]
co-owner that [the recording co-owner] intends to possess .. .for himself" and "thus may mark the commencement of prescription." Obviously, the only prescription that is possible here is the 30 year
prescription, since the recording co-owner is unlikely to be in good faith.
The jurisprudence, both old and new, has uniformly held that the "title"
contemplated here need not be a "just title" of the kind needed for
the ten year prescription. Thus, the recordation of a partition deed, 1s0
a donation invalid as to form,' 8' and a simulated sale' 8 were held
sufficient to rebut the presumption of precariousness by the recording
co-owner, although none of the above deeds qualify as "just title," i.e.,
title "translative of ownership."' 83 To this list Frank Petroleum, Inc.
v. Babineaux84 adds the recordation of an ex parte judgment of possession which sends the co-owners into possession of the entire property
85
rather than half of it.
Tax sales seem to be an entirely different matter. The old jurisprudential rules on the subject may be summarized as follows: The
adjudication to one co-owner of the entire property at a tax sale does
not divest the other co-owners of their interest in the property, but
operates simply as a payment of the taxes on their behalf. The adjudicatee co-owner is, of course, entitled to reimbursement, but he cannot
become owner by prescription of either ten or thirty years. 8 6 The same
rule applies when the co-owner redeems the property within the redemptive period from a third-party adjudicatee at the tax sale, 8 7 but
not when the redemption occurs after the expiration of the redemption
period. 8 In Boase v. Edmonson, 8 9 Mrs. Edmonson redeemed the property from a third party who had bought it one month earlier at a tax
90
sale and had recorded his purchase. Following Golson and Grizzaffi1

180. See Dupuis v. Broadhurst, 213 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Minton v.
Whitworth, 393 So. 2d 294 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
181. See Givens v. Givens, 273 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
182. See Detraz v. Pere, 183 So. 2d 401 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
183. See La. Civ. Code art. 3483 comment (b).
184. 446 So. 2d 862 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
185. See also General Am. Co. of Texas v. Williams, Inc., 441 So. 2d 1268 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1983); Towles v. Heirs of Morrison, 428 So. 2d 1029 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1983) (co-owner rebutted the presumption of precariousness by recording a title from a
third party purporting to convey to him the entire property).
186. See Atlantic Refining Co. v. Golson, 127 So. 2d 341 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
Laches and estoppel are mentioned as possible exceptions.
187. See British American Oil Prod. Co. v. Grizzaffi, 135 So. 2d 559 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1961).
188. See Holloway v. Holloway, 221 La. 875, 60 So. 2d 468 (1952).
189. 471 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
190. See supra notes 178-79.
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the court held that the redemption of the property within the redemption
period by Mrs. Edmonson operated "for the benefit of all of her coowners. Thus, her act was not an act of possession adverse to her coheirs and for her exclusive interest. Consequently, prescription was not
triggered and she was not entitled to recover in a possessory action."' 9
From Adverse to Precarious
When the possessor acknowledges that he is possessing on behalf
of someone other than himself, he not only interrupts the running of
prescription,' 9 2 but also renders his subsequent possession precarious. 93
In Briggs v. Pellerin,'94 the defendant rendered his possession precarious
by acknowledging before witnesses that the fence enclosing his property
was erroneously placed at a point beyond the limits of his title, thus
enclosing partly the land of his neighbor. But in Nugent v. Franks, 95
the erroneously placed fence was believed by the parties on both sides
(who were cousins) as being on the correct boundary. Relying on the
' 96
statutory presumption that "one is presumed to possess as owner,"'
the court concluded:
Neither the fact that Benton and Chancie were cousins and
friendly neighbors who did not concern themselves with the exact
location of a surveyed boundary, nor the fact that the location
of such a boundary was not known to them carries the implication that Benton Rushing's possession was anything other than
as owner to the visible boundaries of the property possessed by
him. 197
In Comeaux v. Davenport, 98 the plaintiff signed a lease from the
record owners of the disputed property, after having possessed it adversely as owner for twenty-three years. Had this lease been valid, it
would have constituted an acknowledgment capable of not only interrupting the plaintiff's prescription of twenty-three years, but also of
preventing prescription from running again by rendering the plaintiff's
subsequent possession precarious. However, after expressing "serious
misgivings regarding the validity of plaintiff's consent"' 199 because he
could not read and did not know what he was signing, the court declared

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

471 So. 2d at 851.
See La. Civ. Code art. 3464.
See pertinent discussion in Symeonides, supra note 26, at 137.
428 So. 2d 1087 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
471 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
La. Civ. Code art. 3427.
Nugent, 471 So. 2d at 824.
452 So. 2d 818 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
Id.at 821.
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the lease invalid because, of the two co-owners named as lessors in the
lease document, only one had signed it.
In Williams v. McEacharn,200 the defendant was allowed to testify,
over the hearsay objections of plaintiff's attorney, that plaintiff's ancestor, who had died long before the trial, had acknowledged orally that
he was possessing more land than his title called for, and that he had
asked defendant's permission to continue possessing as before. Apparently relying on this testimony, the trial court found that plaintiff's
ancestor's possession was precarious. The court of appeals reversed this
finding as manifestly erroneous, because:
No evidence of any farm lease was produced at trial to show
that the Chocklins rented the property from anyone.
The lengthy undisturbed use of the enclosed disputed property
by the Chocklins without paying rent to anyone is a strong
circumstance indicating their intent to possess as owners.
Plaintiff is entitled to the strong legal presumption provided
in LSA-CC art. 3427 ... because the Chocklins did not commence their possession in the name of or for another. The
testimony of Malcolm McEacharn that Abner made a declaration
against his interest in 1967 long after Chocklin had possessed
this property for more than thirty years is not sufficient to rebut
the presumption of possession as owner . . . which possession
as owner is also established by the lengthy use of the property. 20 '
A more direct way of reaching this result would be to say that,
since it was made "long after ... thirty years" of possession, this
declaration is governed by Civil Code article 3490 which provides that
"with respect to immovables renunciationof acquisitive prescription must
' ' 202
be express and in writing.
203
Ramsey v. Pace contains the following statement:
The exercise of corporeal possession by Pace's mineral lessee,
Marshall Exploration, over the five acres in question inures to
Pace, notwithstanding Ramsey's testimony that he gave verbal
'permission to Marshall to so operate. Marshall's exercise of this
corporeal possession can better be attributed to its mineral lease
from Pace because Ramsey's lease to Marshall excluded the 10
2 04
acres.

200. 464 So. 2d 20 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
201. Id. at 24.
202. Emphasis added. Compare with McPherson v. Roy, 390 So. 2d 543 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1980). See also pertinent discussion in Symeonides, supra note 26, at 134.
203. 467 So. 2d 1202 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985); see discussion supra text accompanying
notes 146-65.
204. Id.at 1207.
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It should be recalled, however, that Ramsey was found by the court to
be Pace's precarious possessor. Therefore, even if Marhsall's corporeal
possession were to be attributed to Ramsey, this would probably not
amount to the "actual notice" required by article 3439 thus converting
his precarious possession to possession as owner.
COMPONENT PARTS OF BuILDINGS

Civil Code Article 466, as revised in 1978, provides as follows:
"Things permanently attached to a building or other construction,
such as plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical or other installations, are
its component parts."
"Things are considered permanently attached if they cannot be
removed without substantial damage to themselves or to the immovable
to which they are attached."
A literal reading of the article strongly suggests that its two paragraphs are closely interdependent, and that the second paragraph is but
a guide for applying the first paragraph, and more particularly for
defining the meaning of the phrase "permanently attached." Such a
reading would mean that the items enumerated in paragraph one can
become component parts of a building only when they pass the test of
permanent (physical) attachment described in paragraph two. Thus, a
thing "such as . .. [an] electrical installation" would have to be "permanently attached" in such a way that it "cannot be removed without
substantial damage to itself or to the building." Conversely, an item
that meets the physical test of permanent attachment described in the
second paragraph would not qualify as a component part, unless it falls
into one of the categories of things enumerated in the first paragraph
or sufficiently similar ("such as") thereto.
Although plausible, such a literal interpretation of article 466 would
be historically and functionally incorrect. It seems that the two paragraphs were placed together under a single article as a result of historical
accident rather than deliberate planning. A cursory look at the sources
of article 466 reveals that its two paragraphs were derived from two
separate articles of the Civil Code of 1870 which provided for two
distinct categories of immovables. The first paragraph of current article
466 can be traced to, and was intended to replace, former article 467.
The latter provided that things such as "water pipes ...heating pipes
... [and] electric and gas lighting fixtures" are immovables by nature
"when actually connected with or attached to the building by the
owner." 2 5 The substance of this article has been reproduced in paragraph

205.

Emphasis added. The full text of former article 467 was as follows:

[Wlire screens, water pipes, gas pipes, sewerage pipes, heating pipes, radiators,
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one of current article 466,206 with a number of cosmetic changes and
one substantive change. The cosmetic changes consisted in grouping the
items enumerated in former article 467 into categories such as "plumbing,
heating, cooling, electrical or other installations. ' 2 °7 The substantitve
change was to eliminate the requirement of "unity of ownership," that
is, the requirement that the attachment be made by the owner of the
building.208 True, the critical words "connected or attached" of former
article 467, were also changed to "permanently attached" in the first
paragraph of current article 466. However, the word "permanent" in
that paragraph is intended to have a temporal rather than a physical
connotation, i.e., permanent as opposed to temporary, not permanent
as opposed to loose attachment. While a physically close attachment to,
or incorporation into, the immovable usually connotes a certain degree
of permanency in the temporal sense, a loose attachment does not
necessarily connote lack of permanency. A loosely attached item of the
kind enumerated in the first paragraph of current article 466 or sufficiently analogous thereto, may well be viewed by the community as
permanently serving the immovable. If so, the item would qualify as a
component part of the building, even when the item is easily removable
and thus does not meet the rest of the second paragraph of current
article 466.20 9 Thus read, paragraph one of current article 466 is consistent
with the spirit of its source provision, former article 467, and the way
the former article was interpreted by the jurisprudence. 2 0
The second paragraph of current article 466 can be traced to, and
was intended to replace, 2 ' former article 469 which provided that "movables .. .affixed to the ...[building] with plaster, or mortar, or such
as cannot be taken off without being broken or injured, or without

electric wires, electric and gas lighting fixtures, bathtubs, lavatories, closets,
sinks, gasplants, meters and electric light plants, heating plants and furnances,
when actually connected with or attached to the building by the owner for the
use or convenience of the building are immovable by their nature.
206. Although comment (d) under current article 466 states that former article 467
"has been surpressed," the similarity between former article 467 and current article 466
paragraph one is simply too obvious.
207. La. Civ. Code art. 466.
208. See La. Civ. Code art. 466 comment (c). See also A. Yiannopoulos, supra note
50, § 96, at 294. Another change was the elimination of the requirement that the attachment
be "for the use or convenience of the building." (emphasis added). For this change see
La. Civ. Code art. 466 comment (d); A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 50, § 96, at 294.
209. In the words of Professor Yiannopoulos, "[sluch things are considered to be
permanently attached as a matter of law, that is, without regard to the test of article
466(2). Facility of removal is immaterial." A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 50, § 96, at 293.
210. For a comprehensive discussion of the meaning of former article 467 and the
jurisprudence under it, see A. Yiannopoulos, Property § 47, in 2 Civil Law Treatise,
(1967).
211. See La. Civ. Code art. 466 comment a.
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breaking or injuring ... the building" are "supposed to have [been]
attached ... forever," 2 2 and thus they "are likewise immovable[s] by
destination." ' 231 Former article 469 differed from former article 467, in
that it contemplated movables other than those enumerated in former
article 467, and that it required a much closer degree of attachment to,
or incorporation into, the immovable than did former article 467.214 The
difference between the two former articles is now preserved in the two
paragraphs of current article 466, despite a poor choice of words. Thus,
if read in light of its sources, the second paragraph of current article
466 will have to be read as follows: Things permanently attached to a
building or other construction so that they cannot be removed without
substantial damage to themselves or to the thing to which they are
attached, are likewise its component parts. Such a rewriting of the second
paragraph would more clearly disassociate it from the first paragraph,
and would bring to the surface the implicit intent of the drafters that
the second paragraph be used to determine "what constitutes permanent
attachment with respect to things ... [other than those] covered by the
preceding paragraph.' '25
Equibank v. United States2 6 has rendered unnecessary a legislative
rewriting of article 466, by interpreting it along the lines suggested
above, relying on the testimony of Professor Yiannopoulos, the drafter
of the article, who had testified as an expert witness at the trial. The
issue in Equibank was whether a set of valuable chandeliers attached
by the owner to his mortgaged house were component parts of it, in
which case they would be subject to the mortgage in favor of Equibank,
or rather whether they were separate movables, in which case they would
be subject to a tax lien in favor of the Internal Revenue Service. Because
the chandeliers could be, and were in fact, removed "without substantial
damage to themselves or to the immovable to which they were attached,'2 1 7 they could not be component parts under the second paragraph of article 466. But they could still qualify as component parts

212.

The full text of La. Civ. Code art. 469 (1870) was as follows:

The owner is supposed to have attached to his tenement or building forever
such movables as are affixed to the same with plaster, or mortar, or such as
cannot be taken off without being broken or injured, or without breaking or
injuring the part of the building to which they are attached.
This article was obviously not a self-contained article, but was intended to define the
term "permanent attachment" as that term was used in the last paragraph of former
article 468, dealing with immovables by destination.
213. La. Civ. Code art. 468 (1870) (last paragraph).
214. For a comprehensive analysis of former articles 469 and 467, see A. Yiannopoulos,
supra note 210, at §§ 49-55.
215. A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 50, § 96, at 293.
216. 749 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1985).
217. La. Civ. Code art. 466, para. 2.
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under the less stringent test of the first paragraph which is satisfied
with a looser degree of permanent attachment than that of the second
paragraph, provided that the item in question fits into the categories
of "plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical or other installations ' 21 8 or is
sufficiently similar thereto. The category of electrical installation was
the obvious candidate, and the court turned to "the views of the
public" 2 19 to determine its meaning. The court distinguished between
"plug-in" items such as "table and floor lamps, toasters, can openers,
... radios, television sets, ' 220 etc., on the one hand, and, "built-in
stoves or ovens, wall and ceiling electric heaters, central heating and
221 on the
air conditioning . . . physically attached light fixtures ...
other. "In the eyes of society" the court held, the items of the first
category "are not electrical installations. They are not fixed in place.
No special knowledge or expertise is needed to engage or disengage the
electrical power source. They do not constitute component parts of the
,222 On the other hand, the items of the second category
building ...
are "permanently" connected to the interior wiring of the building . . . . The connection and disconnection from the power
source poses a danger to the untutored or unskilled and requires
knowledge of electricity . . . . [T]hese electrical units, from the
societal viewpoint, are not movable; they are electrical installations which become a component part of the building. . . to
which they are attached. . . . [A]n installed light fixture, be it
an expensive, antique chandelier or a garden-variety fixture,
2
becomes a component part of the building.
Thus the chandeliers in Equibank were held to be component parts of
the residence "despite the fact that they could be removed without
22 4
damage to the chandeliers or the residence.
PARTITION OF PROPERTY

SUBJECT TO

A

USUFRUCT

225

involved the oft-debated issue of partition by liCahn v. Cahn
subject
to a usufruct. 226 The plaintiff in Cahn was
citation of property

218. La. Civ. Code art. 466, para. 1.
219. 749 F.2d at 1179.
220. Id.
221. Id.at 1180.
222. Id.at 1179.
223. Id.at 1179-80.
224. Id.at 1180.
225. 468 So. 2d 1176 (La. 1985).
226. See, e.g., Pasternak v. Samuels, 415 So. 2d 211 (La. 1982); Devillier v. Devillier,
371 So. 2d 1230 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 So. 2d 546 (La. 1979); A.
Yiannopoulos, Personal Servitudes § 8, in 3 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, (2d ed. 1978);
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the owner of an undivided one-fourth of a house in full ownership and
the naked owner of another undivided one fourth subject to a usufruct
in favor of his stepmother, the defendant. Partition by licitation was
supposedly prohibited in such cases by Civil Code article 543 as enacted
in 1976 and as interpretated by the supreme court in Pasternak v.
Samuels,227 but is permitted by the current version of the article as
revised in 1983. While recognizing that the revision of article 543 was
a specific "attempt to legislatively overrule Pasternak,' ' 22 8 the Cahn court
felt that the 1983 amendment was substantive rather than declarative or
procedural, and thus could not apply retroactively to usufructs such as
the one in Cahn, which were established before 1983.229 The claim for
partition was therefore denied.
Normally, a legislative overruling of a judicial decision does not
change the law, but rather a particular judicial interpretation of it, and
re-establishes or clarifies what was supposed to be the true meaning of
the interpreted law. This was indeed the original purpose of the revision
of article 543. However, the final language of the official comments do
not clearly bear this out, 230 and in fact contain a statement relied upon

Note, Civil Code Article 543 and the Problem of Partition by Licitation of Property
Subject to a Usufruct, 43 La. L. Rev. 787 (1983); Note, Civil Law Property-Civil Code
Article 543 and the Prohibition of Partition by Licitation of Property Subject to Usufruct,
55 Tul. L. Rev. 224 (1980).
227. 415 So. 2d 211 (La. 1982). The proper interpretation of former article 543 has
been the subject of exhaustive debate. See supra note 226. Rather than adding to that
debate, this paper addresses the other issues involved in Cahn.
228. Cahn, 468 So. 2d at 1180.
229. [W]e conclude that the 1983 amendment to C. C. 543 must not be applied
retroactively to property rights which were acquired upon Moise Cahn's death
in 1978. This situation does not fall within one of the exceptions to the rule
prohibiting retroactive application. C. C. 543, as amended, does not merely
interpret an existing law or provide procedural rules. Instead, it changes the
law and establishes a new rule which permits partition by licitation in situations
in which it was theretofore prohibited. Since new substantive rights and duties
are established, C. C. 8 and Art. I § 23, La. Const. prohibit giving C. C. 543
retroactive effect, absent a clear indication from the legislature that retroactive
application was intended.
The revised version of C. C. 543 and the accompanying comments contain
no express indication regarding retroactivity. The official comments indicate that
the amendment was intended to "change the law governing partition of property
held in indivision ......
Cahn, 468 So. 2d at 1181.
230. Comment (c) under revised article 543 contains a statement to the effect that the
revised article "accords with the rationale of Smith v. Nelson, 121 La. 170, 46 So. 200
(La. 1908) and the holding of Devillier v. Devillier, 371 So. 2d 1230 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1979)." Unlike Pasternak, Devillier had permitted partition by licitation by applying to
the former version of article 543 a rationale that is consistent with the new version of
article 543.
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by Cahn,23' to the effect that the purpose of the article was "to change
the law." ' 23 2 Even so, however, the issue of the retroactivity of new
article 543 should not be considered entirely closed, for reasons expressed
21
in the dissenting opinion of Justice Calogero. 1
What is more puzzling in Cahn is the court's rather mechanical
rejection of plaintiff's alternative demands for rent or for possession of
the house. The plaintiff's demand for rent was rejected on the ground
that a usufructuary, like "a co-owner has the right to occupy premises
without the obligation of paying rent to other co-owners for occupancy
of their undivided interest. ' 23 4 The court's holding on this issue was
based on Juneau v. Laborde211 and Stewart v. Crump,236 which, aside
from the fact that they lack any legislative foundation, do not seem to
support as general a proposition as the one quoted above. Stewart had
rejected the defendant's claim for rent, but only because the property
was occupied, not by the other co-owner, but rather by his mother and
the defendant's stepmother. "She alone occupied the property, and she
alone is actually liable for the rent, if any one is,''237 the court said.
Juneau had rejected the plaintiff's demand for rent, but only because
"plaintiffs have never sought occupancy of any part of the premises
nor has the right of occupancy been denied by defendant. ' 238 The Juneau
court did say that "a co-owner, who has been deprived of the right of
possession by reason of his co-owner's exclusive occupancy, may claim
damages from the date upon which he has demanded occupancy and
has been refused by the possessor." 23 9 Thus, the plaintiff in Cahn should
be entitled to rent for his one-fourth of the house, at least from the
date of judicial demand. Furthermore, even if one accepts the proposition
that, as a general matter, co-owners owe no rent to each other, its
application should be restricted to cases in which the co-owners are
entitled to the remedy of partition, not to cases such as Cahn where,
under the court's own holding, partition by licitation is not available,
or where partition in kind is not feasible. The same reasoning applies
to the court's rejection of the plaintiff's claim for possession of the
house. Because the plaintiff sought exclusive possession of the house,
to which he was clearly not entitled, the court denied him partial

231. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
232. La. Civ. Code art. 543 comment (a). A previous, unofficial version of the same
comment provided the purpose of the new article was "to clarify the law."
233. See 468 So. 2d at 1185.
234. Id. at 1183.
235. 228 La. 410, 82 So. 2d 693 (1955).
236. 131 La. 463, 59 So. 903 (1912).
237. Id.at 464, 59 So. at 904.
238. 228 La. at 417 n.l, 82 So. 2d at 696 n.l.
239. Id.at 418, 82 So. 2d at 696.
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possession of the property 240 to which he was clearly entitled. The
consequences of this decision are eloquently stated by Justice Calogero
in his dissenting opinion.
In summary, what the majority in effect is doing by their
decision today is "bequeathing" to Dorothea Cahn, by Court
judgment, that which her husband was unable to leave to her
in his will. And plaintiff, who has appropriately sought redress
by the courts, after almost three years of litigation, is left with
the alternative of self-help, that is, without a court judgment
concerning his rights, to simply show up on the doorstep with
his moving van and move himself (and presumably, family and
friends if he chooses) into the house. And if he does choose
to do this to Dorothea Cahn, she will be left with absolutely
no redress whatsoever, for it is unquestionable that as a usufructuary she has no right to sue for a partition by licitation
against a perfect owner, and according to the majority opinion,
she has no right to exclusive possession since plaintiff has "legally acquired the right of use and enjoyment of an undivided
[one-fourth] interest in the property."
Thus, rather than allowing the partition now, and giving Mrs.
Cahn one-half of the proceeds to use for the remainder of her
life (to buy a home to live in if she chooses) the majority is
leaving her with what could end up being a most unfortunate
outcome, that is, the possibility that an obviously antagonistic
co-owner could move into the house with her. And at that time,
because of the majority opinion rendered today, she will have
no legal right of redress except to move out of the house and
24
thereby lose the value of her usufruct completely. 1
Fortunately, because Cahn was based on the pre-1983 version of
article 543 which was in force for only seven years, 1977-1983, the
possibility of facing the same problem in the future is statistically negligible. However, problems involving competing claims of co-owners to
possession of the property are neither uncommon nor negligible. The
court's handling of this issue in Cahn reveals a clear need for some
legislative intervention in this area. In a case like Cahn and similar cases
where the remedy of partition is not available, this need is urgent. In
other cases where partition is available, legislative intervention may not
be as urgent but is certainly desirable, since partition is often too harsh
a remedy.

240.
241.

See Cahn, 468 So. 2d at 1183-84.
Id. at 1186.

